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A B S T R A C T
Russia has declared a priority interest in developing a strong economic relationship with
the Asia Paciﬁc Region. There has been considerable internal debate over the best strate-
gic approach to such a relationship.While a policy victory has beenwon by a strategy focusing
on the export into the region of manufactured goods and services, a resource-export strat-
egy is still dominant in practice and funding. Here the prospects of each strategy are assessed.
Regarding resource exports, hydrocarbons, copper and iron ore prospects are reviewed, but
most detail is provided on the coal sector. That involves an account of infrastructure issues,
including a major debate over the expansion of the BAM and TransSiberian railways. The
analysis suggests that Russia will struggle both to revitalise the Russian Far East through
manufacturing exports to the APR and to replace revenues earned through resource exports
to the West through an economic ‘turn to the East’.
Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University.
1. Introduction
In recent years Russia has – not for the ﬁrst time – de-
clared a top-priority interest in developing its economic
relationship with the Asia Paciﬁc Region (APR). That can be
explained by various events: Putin’s questioning of Rus-
sia’s partnershipwith theWest inMunich in 2007, the severe
effect on Russia’s economy of theWestern-originated global
ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, signs around the same time of po-
litical and social discontent in the Russian Far East (RFE) in
the context of poor socio-economic indicators for the region,
the impending depletion of natural resources oriented to
Western markets and the opening of new areas of exploi-
tation further east, and the general atmosphere that Asia
is the rising powerhouse of the global economy (Lo, 2014).
All these drivers have been given added force by recent
events in Ukraine.
The new priority has produced a ﬁerce policy debate
(Fortescue, 2015), behind which is a tension between two
reasons for economic engagement with the APR. First, there
is a desire to increase national export earnings through ex-
panding exports to Asian markets. Second, there is a desire
to improve the prosperity of the RFE by providing new em-
ployment opportunities and improving local infrastructure,
to reverse population decline. At the risk of some simpli-
ﬁcation, the ﬁrst reason is likely to produce a policy oriented
towards the export of natural resources, including many not
sourced within the RFE; the second a manufacturing-
oriented approach, based in the RFE and providing more
employment than is likely from resource exploitation. The
two goals are not mutually exclusive, but there has been
clear tension between them.
This can be seen in a sudden change in strategy in 2013.
Until then the policy process had produced an RFE devel-
opment programme heavily oriented towards resource
exports and the infrastructure needed to serve them
(Gosudarstvennaia programma Rossiiskoi Federatsii
‘Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie Dal’nego Vostoka i
Baikal’skogo regiona’, No.466-r, 29 March 2013,
archive.government.ru/gov/results/23721/). It met with
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strong opposition, and in August 2013 the founding Min-
ister of Far Eastern Development (MFED), Viktor Ishaev, was
dismissed from his ministerial position and his post as pres-
idential representative in the Far Eastern region. He was
replaced in the latter position by Yurii Trutnev, who was
also appointed a deputy prime minister, and as minister by
Aleksandr Galushka. Within a month Galushka presented
a new strategy based on the export into the APR of manu-
factured goods and services (including agricultural products),
produced in a new form of special economic zone known
as a ‘territory of accelerated development’ (to be called here,
after its Russian name, TOR) (government.ru/news/7718/).
That was not the end of the resource-export strategy. The
struggle for state funding of resource projects, particular-
ly for infrastructure, continued.
Here the commercial prospects of the two strategies are
examined, with two success indicators being used. The ﬁrst
is commercial viability – will the projects earn a return on
investment; the second – will each strategy meet the goals
set by policy makers, in the case of the TOR strategy bring-
ing increased prosperity to the RFE and in the case of the
resource strategy maintaining national prosperity as supply
and demand decline in the West. Given the complexity of
the issues involved, data availability, and space constraints,
the conclusions will be indicative rather than precise.
2. TOR strategy
The TOR strategy, as originally formulated, is to in-
crease the prosperity of the RFE through the creation of new
jobs and economic activity in special zones in which ﬁrms
from the APR invest to produce non-resource goods for
export to APR markets. This is in the context of manufac-
turing and equipment making up 3 per cent of total exports
from the RFE and Baikal region in 2010, worth $574.7million
(77 per cent were resource exports) (Popova, 2012, p. 8).1
Investors would be attracted to the zones through at-
tractive investment and operating conditions: tax
concessions, ease of gaining approvals, good electricity con-
nections, convenient and competitively priced logistics and
transport, and so on (vedomosti.ru/politics/characters/2015/
05/19/mi-ishodim-iz-prezumptsii-nevinovnosti). There was
much stress on a ‘one stop shop’ approach run by MFED
agencies, requiring the transfer to the newministry of major
administrative functions previously carried out by other
agencies.
Early accounts were vague on what types of activity and
markets were being considered. In February 2014, when
asked by a clearly sceptical reporter the intended export des-
tinations of RFE-manufactured goods and services, Trutnev
replied ‘We are thinking about it’ (kommersant.ru/doc/
2410187). He might have been playing his cards close to
his chest, but the response was not reassuring. Much was
made of Memorandums of Understanding signed with in-
vestors from Japan, China and New Zealand (government.ru/
news/14040) and the interest of Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Daewoo,
LG and Samsung (kommersant.ru/doc/2498003).
We now have details on three TOR projects that have
been established by government decree and another ﬁve ap-
proved by the relevant government commission. Another
seven have gone through the initial approval process but
are not yet publicly identiﬁed. Those approved look very dif-
ferent from what was initially suggested. The three
established by decree are:
‘Khabarovsk’ (government.ru/dep_news/18636/). Resi-
dents include a manufacturer of rooﬁng and insulation
materials, a local food distributor and supermarket opera-
tor, and a Singaporean bitumen producer (government.ru/
news/16902/; kommersant.ru/doc/2723624; vedomosti.ru/
politics/characters/2015/05/19/mi-ishodim-iz-prezumptsii-
nevinovnosti). The federal budget is to provide R1.26 billion
for infrastructure.
‘Nadezhdinskii’ (Nadezhdinskii district, Vladivostok)
(government.ru/dep_news/18635/). Residents include a
bakery, a timber products ﬁrm, also identiﬁed as running
logistics centres, and the food distributor and supermar-
ket operator also involved in ‘Khabarovsk’ (deita.ru/news/
economy/03.04.2015/4870980-tor-nadezhdinskiy-807-
gektar-chistogo-polya-i-nikakikh-obyazatelstv/). The federal
budget is to provide R1.99 billion.
‘Komsomol’sk’ (Komsomol’sk-na-Amur) (government.ru/
dep_news/18637/). Based in the aircraft plant in the city,
the focus is metal fabrication, composite materials, and pre-
cision instruments for aircraft construction, and in one
source timber products (kommersant.ru/doc/2723624);
government.ru/news/17541/). Residents include an energy
conglomerate with industry parks around Russia, a Moscow-
based private investment company, and possibly the aircraft
manufacturer Sukhoi. The federal budget is to provide R902
million.
Those approved at commission level are:
‘Beringovskii’ (Chukotka Autonomous Region). The core res-
ident is the small Australian mining company, Tigers Realm
Coal. The project is to export coking coal from the Bering
coal basin. Planned output is 10 million tonnes per year
(Mtpy), 5–6 Mtpy after enrichment. The deposits are situ-
ated close to an existing mine and 39 km from an operating
deepwater port at Beringovskii. The port’s current capaci-
ty is 0.25 Mtpy, and there are plans to expand it to 1 Mtpy.
It is not clear how the remaining output is to be shipped
(kommersant.ru/doc/2718943; gazeta.ru/business/news/
2014/06/10/n_6220925.shtml). The project receives no
funding through the TOR programme, but has received $16.3
million from the Russian Direct Investment Fund, for an 11
per cent equity share (theaustralian.com.au/business/
mining-energy/tigers-realm-coal-grabs-russian-project
-by-the-tail-with-625m-raising/story-e6frg9df-12268616
74038).
‘Belogorsk’ (Amur region). Soya processing and animal feed
(vostokmedia.com/n235691.html; amur.info/news/
2015/05/13/93933).
‘Mikhailovskaia’ (Primore region). Pig farming
(primorsky.ru/news/common/86699/).
1 Financial ﬁgures are usually presented in the currency used in the orig-
inal source. Particularly since the end of 2014 the exchange rate has been
highly volatile. As a rough guide for the period covered by this article, $US1
bought R32.00 on 1 January 2012, R30.54 2013, R32.86 2014 and R59.02
2015.
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‘Kamchatka’. Tourism and hothouse agriculture.
‘Kangalassy’ (Yakutiia). Thirteen residents, including two
from abroad, are claimed. Those identiﬁed are transfer-
ring from the existing Tekhnopark Yakutiia and are engaged
in small scale manufacturing, primarily for the building
sector (ria.ru/economy/20150520/1065463981.html;
tpykt.ru/residents/).
Other potential TORs that have beenmuch discussed and
could well turn up as approved projects are a recreational
zone on the Russian half of Ussuriisk Island in the Ussuri
River; a science park on Russkii Island in Vladivostok; and
the ‘Predmostovaia’ zone in Blagoveshchensk, on the Russian
side of a planned bridge across the Amur River, containing
an oil reﬁnery, cement factory, and warehousing and lo-
gistics (portamur.ru/news/detail/aleksandr-kozlov-tor
-belogorsk-odobrena-k-sozdaniyu/).2
The announced TORs cover a wide range of activities. The
broad geographical spread is presumably not driven by purely
commercial considerations. As a resource project the
Chukotka coal project is an odd man out. There are low and
middle-tech activities, although with no sign of cheap-
labour assembly operations. There are few big Russian
companies involved and few foreign companies. There have
been mixed messages coming from Galushka and Trutnev
regarding foreign investment. Galushka is upbeat about it,
claiming that Asian investors are interested but adopting a
wait and see attitude. Trutnev has suggested that, given the
level of domestic interest, foreign investors are not a prior-
ity (kremlin.ru/news/48085/; government.ru/news/18143/).
Perhaps because of the lack of foreign investment, it is hard
to see a strong export orientation in the activities so far
identiﬁed.
In this context the views of Japanese and Chinese busi-
ness people reported by Kommersant newspaper are telling
(kommersant.ru/doc/2674988). They pointed to poor in-
frastructure, a small domestic market and high wages to
explain their scepticism. Galushka, perhaps coming to terms
with reality, says one has to start small (‘as China did with
its special economic zones’) (vedomosti.ru/politics/
characters/2015/05/19/mi-ishodim-iz-prezumptsii-
nevinovnosti). Certainly the state’s ﬁnancial commitment
is as yet modest. The ﬁfteen projects so far approved will
receive R33 billion in state funding, with core investors
having committed R383 billion (government.ru/news/
18143/).3 The claimed 23,600 new jobs over ten years are
scattered geographically and will hardly transform the RFE
(although they will cover the outmigration from the region
in recent times of over 20,000 per annum) (news.kremlin.ru/
news/47487). While starting small, Galushka’s ambitions are
still considerable, seeing China, South Korea, Singapore and
other Asian Tigers as both role models and competition
(vedomosti.ru/politics/characters/2015/05/19/mi-ishodim-
iz-prezumptsii-nevinovnosti). Even if one overcomes one’s
scepticism regarding each individual TOR, it is hard to see
the approach leading to economic activity on the scale of
a Russian Asian Tiger. It is not surprising that the resource
strategy is still much in evidence.
3. Resource strategy
Russia’s hopes in the resource sector rest primarily on
oil and gas, but there are also expectations for a range of
minerals, as well as ﬁshing and forestry. Oil and gas have
received attention from others, and nomore than a summary
will be provided here. More detail will be provided on
mineral exports, speciﬁcally coal, iron ore and copper. Gold
is an important mining activity in the region but is not
considered here, on the grounds that relatively little is
exported (lbma.org.uk/assets/blog/alchemist_articles/
Alch54Pikanovskiy.pdf). Fishing and forestry will not receive
any attention. In examining Russia’s prospects, Australia –
a major exporter into the region across most product types
considered here – will be used as a comparator.
4. Oil and gas
Beginningwith oil, since late Soviet times themain centre
of Russian production has beenWest Siberia, shipping output
westwards through a pipeline network. The peaking of those
ﬁelds and the turn to new sources of oil, including in East
Siberia, have roughly coincided with strategic interest in
shifting market orientation fromwest to east. ASTO, a pipe-
line from East Siberia to the Paciﬁc coast, with a spur line
to China, came on line in 2010–11, and has gradually ﬁlled
with 50 Mtpy of East Siberian oil. Oil is also produced off-
shore at Sakhalin.
Russia’s other great oil hope is the Arctic shelf. Those
ﬁelds are located more conveniently for delivery west-
wards, although the opening of the Northern Sea Route on
a consistent basis could change that.
While the potential for Russian oil exports into the APR
cannot be ignored, there are sceptics. Shadrina and Bradshaw
(2013, p. 493) ask whether enough oil will be recovered to
replace declining output in West Siberia. They suggest that
the state has failed to create the conditions needed to attract
the required investment.
Current Russian gas exports to the APR are small-scale
LNG deliveries from Sakhalin-2 (owned 50 per cent by
Gazprom, 27.5 per cent Shell, 12.5 per cent Mitsui, and 10
per cent Mitsubishi). Seven million tonnes per year of LNG
are exported to Japan, roughly 70 per cent of the plant’s
exports (vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/491741/gazpromu-
malo-trub). That represents 10 per cent of Japan’s imports.
In 2012 Russia provided 2.5 per cent of China’s LNG imports,
and 6.0 per cent of South Korea’s (Shadrina & Bradshaw,
2013, p. 483). Gazprom has plans for another 10 Mtpy LNG
plant on Sakhalin, as well as a plant of the same capacity
near Vladivostok (Shadrina & Bradshaw, 2013, p. 487).
Rosneft in partnership with Exxon has had plans to build
a 5Mtpy plant on Sakhalin. Decision-makers face a dilemma.
Putin is reluctant to offend either Gazprom or Rosneft, but
there are concerns that there will not be enough gas to serve
all RFE LNG plants and over allowing competition between
Russian LNG exporters (news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/18824).
Serious ﬁnancing diﬃculties in current circumstances might
render the dilemma moot.
2 Other projects that were on an early list of possibilities can be found
at www.asi.ru/news/20192.
3 For a breakdown of funding by TOR, see kommersant.ru/doc/2747286.
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The Yamal LNG project, on the Arctic coast, is privately
owned, currently by Novatek (60 per cent) and Total and
China’s CNPC (20 per cent each). Novatek is owned by
Gennadii Timchenko and Leonid Mikhelson, both consid-
ered to have good relations with Putin. Design capacity is
16.5 Mtpy, with start up in 2017. Eighty per cent of output
is already contracted to Asian buyers (vedomosti.ru/business/
articles/2015/05/15/novatek-hoc…ot-vneshekonombanka-
garantii-na-3-mlrd-po-kreditam-na-yamal-spg). With the
project suffering cost overruns, Novatek sold 20 per cent to
CNPC in early 2014 and is negotiating the sale of another
9 per cent (vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/05/15/
novatek-hoc…ot-vneshekonombanka-garantii-na-3-mlrd
-po-kreditam-na-yamal-spg).
In addition to equity sales, the project has a major bor-
rowing programme. It has been looking for $20 billion from
Chinese banks and agencies, and has conﬁrmed loans of $3
billion from Sberbank and $1 billion from Gazprombank, as
well as a $3 billion credit guarantee from VEB. It has also
been allocated R150 billion from Russia’s sovereign wealth
fund, the Fund for National Welfare (FNW) (vedomosti
.ru/business/articles/2015/06/05/595300-sberbank-i
-gazprombank-mogut-videlit-na-yamal-spg-4-mlrd).
On a global scale Russia’s LNG plans are modest. Pro-
jections suggest that Russia will have no more than 15 per
cent of the Asian LNG market by 2050 (Koch-Weser &
Murray, 2014; Paltsev, 2014). Australian projections run only
to 2025, in which year exports of 130 Mt are predicted
(Australian Bulk Commodity Exports, 2012, p. 68), a ﬁgure
which Russia would barely surpass according to the most
optimistic projection by 2050.
Even before access to Western technology and funding
was limited through sanctions from mid-2014, there were
doubts about even these modest expectations on two
grounds: would Russian output growth be enough to meet
both export and domestic demand, and would prices be at
the level required to bring the country the export earn-
ings on which it depends. An Australian report (Australian
Bulk Commodity Exports, 2012, pp. 48–9) doubts Russia’s ca-
pacity to reach the output volumes needed, given the high
capital costs involved. For Shadrina and Bradshaw (2013,
p. 491) the issue is price. They conclude that it remains to
be seen ‘whether or not Russian LNG can compete on com-
mercial terms in a highly competitive market’.
While there might be doubts about Russian LNG, Russian
pipeline gas is recognised as a competitive threat by LNG
exporters (Australian Bulk Commodity Exports, 2012, pp. 33,
117). In May 2014, after many years of negotiation, a deal
was signed with China for the delivery of pipeline gas along
the so-called Eastern route, to take gas from yet to be de-
veloped ﬁelds in East Siberia to the border at
Blagoveshchensk in the Amur region. Capacity is to be
15Mtpy, at a construction cost of $7.3 billion, with an initial
start up date of 2018 (Shadrina & Bradshaw, 2013, p. 487).
There has been a lot of discussion on how beneﬁcial the deal
will be to Russia, with many believing that the return
on investment will be minimal if not negative
(www.rbcdaily.ru/economy/562949992526177).
With the Eastern route deal done, attention turned to
what had been Russia’s ﬁrst choice, the ‘Altai’ pipeline from
existing ﬁelds in West Siberia that currently serve Europe-
an markets, with a pre-contract agreement signed in May
2015 for the delivery of 30 billion tonnes of gas over 30 years
(vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/05/12/gazprom
-i-cnpc-dogovorilis-ob-usloviyah-postavok-gaza-po-
zapadnomu-marshrutu). With European markets in decline
an alternative is needed, and with a relatively short new
pipeline to the Chinese border the project is attractive in
capital expenditure terms. However the fact that the pipe-
line arrives at the border in China’s north-west makes it a
less attractive option for the Chinese. The project is a long
way from start up, with the decline in sales to Europe hap-
pening now. That does not help Russia’s negotiating position.
Because of the ﬁxed-point nature of pipeline gas, the balance
of power between supplier and customer is crucially im-
portant, and there are doubts that in the case of Russian-
Chinese pipeline gas arrangements the balance is in Russia’s
favour (Koch-Weser & Murray, 2014).
In summary, there are expert doubts as to whether there
will be enough oil and gas to sell to APR markets at an ad-
equate proﬁt margin to replace current revenues that are
largely derived fromWestern Siberian sales to Europe. The
doubts apply to the long term, whether prices will be con-
sistently high enough to cover the uncertainties of both
output and recovery costs in challenging locational and tech-
nological circumstances; and in the short term, in the case
of oil whether an output gap between decline in brownﬁelds
in West Siberia and the arrival of replacement output from
greenﬁelds in the Arctic and East Siberia can be avoided,
and in the case of gas a sales gap as markets decline in the
West before they can be served in the East (Global Trends,
2013).
5. Other resource exports
The number of non-hydrocarbon resource projects in the
RFE development programme is enormous.4 Many are un-
likely to proceed. Here brief details are given on the more
prominent iron ore and copper projects, before a more de-
tailed examination of the commodity with the most
potential, coal.
5.1. Copper
Both projects to be described are in the Chita region.
Udokan is large (reserves of 1.3 billion tonnes) but with dif-
ﬁcult topography and geological structure (Denisov, 1999).
The licence, which includes a copper smelter producing
474,000 tonnes of cathode copper per year from 36 Mt of
ore, is held by Metalloinvest and Rostekh, politically well-
connected companies. It is costed in the RFE development
programme at R770 million of state money, plus R930
million from the project owners, as well as separate state
funding for the Novaia Chara rail station, situated on BAM
201 km from the deposit (Gosudarstvennaia programma,
2013, pp. 142, 829). However the project has not ap-
peared in any speciﬁc funding programmes. In April 2014
licence conditions were amended to extend deadlines for
4 Minerals projects can be found in Sub-programme 2, from page 33 of
Appendix (dopolnitel’nyi material) No.1.
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mine start-up and full capacity from 2014 and 2016 to 2020
and 2024 (vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/682001/
metalloinvest-podelitsya-udokanom). Metalloinvest and
Rostekh have been unable to attract Western partners for
the mine, and are now looking for Chinese involvement, so
far with no clear response (top.rbc.ru/economics/19/
05/2014/924726.shtml).
The other Chita copper project, Bystrinskoe, is owned by
Norilsk Nickel (and is not to be confused with another
project by the same name on Kamchatka). It was original-
ly touted as involving four or ﬁve copper and polymetal
mines, but the scale of the project has been reduced as re-
serves failed to be proven. Eventually a ﬁrm commitment
was made to the mining and enrichment of copper at
Bystrinskoe, with claimed reserves of 2.7 Mt (Fortescue &
Rautio, 2011, p. 845; polit.ru/news/2013/01/25/gok/). In Sep-
tember 2014 the company approved tenders for construction
of the mine and enrichment plant to process 10Mtpy of ore,
with start up inMay 2017 (nornik.ru/assets/ﬁles/Prilozhenie
-N-5—informaciya-na-sajt—rus.pdf).
In October 2014 Norilsk Nickel head, Vladimir Potanin,
reported to Putin that his company had spent R8 billion on
the mine, and another R8 billion (representing 25 per cent
of the cost) on a rail line connecting it to Borzia, a station
on the line to the Chinese border at Zabaikalsk
(news.kremlin.ru/news/46891). In September 2014 the
company claimed Chinese interest in the project
(kommersant.ru/doc/2567904), but with no sign of inter-
est being converted into money in May 2015 a $1 billion
credit from state-owned bank VTB was agreed
(vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/05/18/nornikel-
privlekaet-1-mlrd-u-vtb), with talk of VTB taking a 25 per
cent equity stake. Norilsk Nickel has the cash reserves to
fund the project, but is keen to share the cost and risk with
others. Seemingly, as is ever more the case in contempo-
rary Russia, it will share cost and risk with a state-owned
bank.
Although data are vague, if both Bystrinskoe and Udokan
were to go ahead (the former more likely than the latter),
they would produce roughly 540,000 tonnes of concen-
trate and cathode copper per annum. For comparison, in
2013, Australia – not the biggest producer in the sector –
exported 2.18 Mt of ore and concentrate, of which 925,000
went to China (Resources and Energy Quarterly, 2014, p. 84).
5.2. Iron ore
Most Russian iron ore is mined and fed into domestic
steel making in the western part of the country. Although
the world’s ﬁfth biggest exporter (25.5 Mt of total output
of 102.5 Mt in 2013), Russia is well behind the two biggest,
Australia (613.4 Mt) and Brazil (329.6 Mt) (Steel Statistical
Yearbook, 2014, pp. 102–3).
There is no demand for iron ore for steel making east
of Evraz’s operations in West Siberia.5 A number of iron ore
projects are listed in the RFE development programmewith
a steel mill included. But there must be serious doubts that
the mills will be built, meaning that, with one exception to
be described below, Far Eastern iron ore projects are export-
oriented. We will not look any further at iron ore projects
in Magadan and Irkutsk regions that are listed in the RFE
development programme.
The Priamure iron ore project is owned by the Petropav-
lovsk gold mining company. It involves mining at Gar in the
Amur region and Kimkano-Sutara in the Jewish Autono-
mous Region. The Kimkano-Sutara deposits, diﬃcult but
already operational, have a design capacity of 10 Mtpy. An
enrichment plant at Kimkano-Sutara entered production in
early 2015, with a design capacity of 4.18 Mtpy of concen-
trate. There are also plans for a direct reduction plant to
produce 2.5 Mtpy of granulated iron (kommersant.ru/doc/
2416900). The Gar deposit is situated 148 km from
Shimanovskaia station on TransSib. After primary enrich-
ment on-site, its output of 7.25 Mtpy, is to be hauled to
Kimkano-Sutara for further processing (n-dv.ru/?page
=3&article=114).
The project includes a bridge across the Amur at
Nizhneleninskoe (immediately to the south of Birobidzhan,
which is on TransSib) to deliver output to China. Its planned
capacity is 5.2 Mtpy, with possible expansion to 20 Mtpy
(veb.ru/strategy/region/dv/). Construction of the bridge from
the Chinese side – 1.9 km of a total length of 2.2 km – is pro-
ceeding with dispatch. Funding has not been ﬁnalised for
the Russian side of the bridge, and so construction has not
begun (government.ru/dep_news/17722/; vedomosti.ru/
economics/articles/2015/05/15/rossiisko-kitaiskii-most-
nedoschitalsya-investora; vedomosti.ru/politics/characters/
2015/06/08/595566-mi-prosto-otsechem-obman). Russian
Railways is committed to spending R8 billion on upgrad-
ing the rail line connecting Birobidzhan to Nizhneleninskoe
(kommersant.ru/doc/2416900).
In March 2015 the Amur region governor informed
Medvedev in a muddled conversation that the project had
beneﬁted from the ruble’s December 2014 devaluation and
was working at full capacity (government.ru/news/17303).
One nevertheless agrees with Helmer (2014) that it is un-
likely that the operation is proﬁtable in other than highly
favourable price circumstances.
The Timir iron ore project – situated in south Yakutia and
sometimes known by the name of its ﬁrst stage, Taezhnoe
– is owned by Evraz. With claimed reserves of 3.5 billion
tonnes the Taezhnoe deposit is 150 km north of Neryungri,
which is connected by rail to Tynda, on BAM. The Taezhnoe
stage – a mine and enrichment plant producing 4 Mtpy of
concentrate – is currently scheduled to be operational by
2017. The state is listed in the RFE development pro-
gramme as providing R836.6 million to build a rail line
from the deposit to the enrichment plant (with Evraz’s
investment in the project shown at R164.2 billion)
(Gosudarstvennaia programma, 2013, pp. 832, 1145). InMarch
2015 it was announced that the project would share with
ﬁve other projects the modest sum of R16.8 billion through
MFED’s investment programme (government.ru/media/
ﬁles/L2KIqkMwAvU.pdf).
In September 2014 Putin reminded Evraz’s Abramov that
the licence included a steel mill. Abramov undertook to re-
consider the company’s position not to build the mill, but
5 The only steel plant further east is AmurSteel, an electric arc-ﬁred
furnace and so not a user of iron ore. It has been in constant ﬁnancial dif-
ﬁculties and generally non-operational since the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
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suggested that the prospects were not encouraging
(news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/46522). While that frees the
entire output for shipment, there are claims that concen-
trate will be delivered to Evraz’s steel plants inWest Siberia,
which currently bring bought-in inputs fromwestern Russia
(expert.ru/expert/2014/38/kak-ruda-zavisit-ot-protsenta/).
In 2013 Evraz’s West Siberian steel making took 4.54 Mt of
iron ore inputs from Evraz’s ownmines, including some that
are now non-operational, and bought in 4.29 Mt (Evraz,
2013, p. 52). We do not know how much of Taezhnoe’s
output will be used in-house, but it appears likely that there
will be little left for export.
Regarding the scale of Russian exports more generally,
in 2012, 25.5 Mt of iron ore were exported, against the
527.0 Mt of the world’s biggest exporter, Australia, of which
393.4 Mt were shipped to China (Steel Statistical Yearbook,
2013, p. 99; Resources and Energy Quarterly, 2014, p. 87). We
do not have data on current exports of iron ore from the
Russian east, but the ﬁgures cannot be high, given the small
output of the region. In 2012 the RFE produced 3.4 Mt and
East Siberia 17.7 Mt. Neither reserve ﬁgures nor the proj-
ects just described lead us to expect radical increases
(mineral.ru/Facts/Russia/161/529/3_05_fe.pdf, pp. 107, 111).
Russia’s largest producer and exporter, Metalloinvest, op-
erates in western Russia. In 2013 it exported 11.147 Mt of
ore and pellets (of total ore output of 38.4Mt), evenly divided
between Asian and European markets. Although the
company describes China as a prioritymarket, it also stresses
that its preference is for long-term contracts with domes-
tic steel makers (Metalloinvest, 2013, pp. 6, 7, 29, 60).
Regarding costs, Helmer (2014) provides data that suggest
that the east’s small mines will struggle to be competi-
tive. In summary, scale and cost issues in a highly
competitive market make building an export-oriented iron
ore mine in eastern Russia a very marginal proposition.
6. Coal
Russia’s greatest hopes are for coal. It is a key part of the
policy debate over RFE development, since arguably themost
controversial issue – the expansion of the BAM and
TransSiberian railways – is intimately linked to Russian coal
exports to the APR.
There has been a steady increase in exports in recent
years (see Table 1). Steaming coal makes up about 85 per
cent (‘Itogi’, 2014a, p. 62). Russia is the world’s ﬁfth biggest
coal exporter, third in coking coal (‘Itogi’, 2014a, p. 62). A
major downturn in domestic demand, caused by declines
in steel production and gasiﬁcation of local markets, has
made exports more important for coal producers.
Around 80 per cent of exports come from the Kuzbass,
in south-east Siberia, with East Siberia contributing around
10 per cent and the RFE slightly less. Around 60 per cent
of coal exports are shipped by sea, of which 53.5 per cent
went through eastern ports in 2013 (‘Itogi’, 2014a, pp. 62–3).
Table 2 shows the top importers of Russian thermal and
coking coal. India, seen by many as a major importer in the
future, imported no coal from Russia in 2012, 388,000 tonnes
in 2013, and 142,000 in the ﬁrst quarter of 2014 (‘Itogi’,
2014a, p. 64; ‘Itogi’, 2014b, p. 49). The data in Table 1 do
not include the exports of the biggest exporter SUEK. In 2013
it exported 42.4 Mt, of which 12.6 Mt went to China. Other
companies exporting to the region includeMechel (12.01Mt
exported in 2013, of which 6.3 Mt went to China, with the
company providing 7.5 per cent of Chinese imports of coking
coal), and Raspadskaia (3.3 Mt exported in the ﬁrst half of
2014, of which 42 per cent went to the APR, of which 70
per cent, 1.1 Mt, were shipped to China) (vedomosti.ru/
newspaper/article/775941/kitaj-ostanavlivaet-ugol). These
companies operate primarily in the Kuzbass. However
Kuzbass output is peaking, with effects on forecast exports
by region to be outlined later.
6.1. Existing operations
In a quick survey of existing coal operations in the RFE
and East Siberia, we beginwith Sakhalin. In 2012 total output
was 4.1 Mt, of which 1.92 Mt were exported, primarily to
China, Japan and South Korea (energo-news.ru/archives/
108639). The then Sakhalin governor set the goal to increase
output to 9 Mtpy over the following 5–7 years, with 90 per
cent exported (government.ru/news/4586). In 2013 the
island exported 2.3Mt, of which 41.6 per cent went to South
Korea, 31.3 per cent to China, and 27.1 per cent to Japan
(admsakhalin.ru/index.php?id=152).
Table 1
Exports as share of total Russian coal deliveries, 2000–2012, Mt.
2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total deliveries 245.3 272.8 296.5 304.9 314.5 321.9
Exports 37.8 80.1 116.4 117.1 130.4 143.0
Exports as % of total 15.41 29.36 39.26 38.41 41.46 44.42
Sources: ‘Itogi’, 2013, p. 66; ‘Itogi’, 2014a, p. 61.
Table 2
Major importers of Russian coal and coking coal, 2013, Mt.
All coal Coking coal
Volume Ranking Volume Ranking
United Kingdom 24.9 1 1.14 6
Cyprus 21.8 2 0.91 7
Japan 13.4 3 3.26 3
Ukraine 9.6 4 5.13 2
South Korea 9.4 5 1.89 4
China 7.1 6 1.8 5
Switzerland 5.6 8 5.18 1
Note: The data do not include exports by SUEK (17.38 million tonnes),
Yuzkkuzbass (1.3), Resurs/Yuzhnyi (0.93), Raspadskaia (0.36) and Koksovaia
(0.23). Source: ‘Itogi’, 2014a, p. 64.
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The biggest producer on Sakhalin is Vostochnaia
Gornorudnaia Kompaniia (Andreev, 2014). It has been hit
hard by gasiﬁcation and is energetically looking to expand
exports. It claims to have high quality steaming coal with,
given the mine’s proximity to the port of Shakhtersk and
then Asian markets, good export prospects. Exports in-
creased from 450,000 in 2011 to 600,000 in 2012. It had a
target of 2.5 Mt for 2013 but managed only 1.2 Mt. It hopes
to ship 5 Mtpy by 2016.
Growth is limited by port capacity. Ocean-going ships
cannot be loaded directly from the terminal at Shakhtersk.
However the ﬂeet of ice-capable loading barges has been
renewed. The port is now able to handle 2000 tonnes per
hour (a reasonable rate, although the biggest Australian op-
erations handle four times as much or more). It is currently
loading 55,000 tonne ships, with plans to receive 120,000
tonne ships.
Other exporters on the island (Gornyak-1 and
Uglegorskugol’) produce below 1 Mtpy. They export to
nearby APR countries, and both have output and port
expansion plans (www.sakhalin.info/news/84702/;
n-dv.ru/?page=3&article=114).
Mainland RFE producers include Primorskugol, north of
Vladivostok. Owned by SUEK, the company mines steam-
ing coal. Output peaked in 2011 at 5.69Mt, the decline since
the result of gasiﬁcation of the domestic market. In 2013
it exported 567,900 tonnes, mostly to China (Zan’kov, 2014).
SUEK’s Urgalugol, near Khabarovsk, produced 4.639 Mt
of steaming coal in 2013, of which 2.937 Mt was exported
to Asia. Investment of R16 billion is to take output to
8.1 Mtpy by 2019 (zrpress.ru/business/khabarovsk_24
.06.2014_67007_khabarovskij-ugol-rvetsja-v-atr.html). The
mine is included in MFED’s investment programme
(government.ru/media/ﬁles/L2KIqkMwAvU.pdf).
Existing East Siberian mines produce mainly for the do-
mestic market, although Vostoksibugol has export contracts
with Chinese companies and Korea’s Posco, with an export
target of 3 Mtpy over ﬁve years (www.kvsu.ru/companies/
66/). Mechel’s ‘Neryungrinskii’, situated close to Neryungri
in Yakutia and therefore accessible by rail to BAM, exports
coking coal to China, Taiwan, Japan and Korea. It is a mature
mine with declining output.
Russkii ugol digs coal in the Kuzbass (c.1.3 Mt in 2013),
Amur (3 Mt) and Khakasia (3.2 Mt). In 2013 it exported
1.51 Mt of steaming coal to South Korea, China and Eastern
Europe. The Amur operations are to be expanded to provide
coal for new power stations, one of which – Erkovitskoe –
is to export electricity to China (kommersant.ru/doc/
2405853). The company plans to expand its Khakasia
operations to 4.5 Mtpy, of which 50 per cent would be ex-
ported (Uzhakhov, 2014).
6.2. Greenﬁeld projects
The main greenﬁeld developments in the region are
Elegest in Tuva, Elga in Sakha, Apsat and Zashulanskoe in
Zabaikal, Denisovskii-Ignalinskii in Yakutia, and the
Beringovskii mine in Chukotka, which has been approved
as a TOR and was described above.
Elegest is a thermal and coking coal project with claimed
reserves of 850Mt and an output target of 6 Mtpy by 2018.
The thermal coal is to be sold domestically and the coking
coal exported to the APR (vedomosti.ru/newsline/news/
11652391/bajsarov_vzyal_ugol). We discuss its transport
infrastructure issues below.
Elga, situated in South Yakutia and owned by Mechel,
has an output target of 11.7 Mtpy upon completion of its
ﬁrst stage in 2017. As with Elegest thermal coal will be sold
on local markets and coking coal exported to the APR, with
a deal with Baosteel already signed (vedomosti.ru/
newspaper/article/418711/desyatina_mechela). With capital
expenditure set at $4.74 billion, of which $2.5 billion is re-
quired for the ﬁrst stage, and in circumstances of severe
ﬁnancial diﬃculties, Mechel has been trying to attract
Chinese, Japanese and Korean involvement, so far with no
success (kommersant.ru/doc/2449581; vedomosti.ru/
newspaper/article/677311/aziya-gotova-vesti-biznes-s-rossiej).
Apsat, owned by SUEK, is about 50 km fromNovaia Chara
station on BAM northeast of Lake Baikal. It has reserves of
2.2–3.5 billion tonnes (Tsinoshkin & Dulin, 2014). Exploi-
tation of the diﬃcult deposit began in March 2012. In 2013
652,500 tonnes were mined, of which 462,100 tonnes were
exported. In the ﬁrst half of 2014, 498,900 tonnes were dug
and 372,500 tonnes were shipped. Fifty-four per cent of
shipments were exported, with China taking 115,475 tonnes,
South Korea 74,500 and Japan 11,175 (Tsinoshkin & Dulin,
2014; Tsinoshkin, Samoilenko, & Dulin, 2014). The plan is
to produce 5 Mtpy by 2021 (news.chita.ru/52747/).
En+’s Vostoksibugol has a 50:50 joint venture, known as
Razrez Ugol’, with China’s Shenhua. In December 2013 it
won the licence to the Zashulanskoe thermal coal deposit
in the Zabaikal region. The coal, while of limited quantity
(reserves of 252Mt), is said to be of good quality. With both
domestic and Chinese markets in view, an open cut mine
is planned for 2018, with full capacity of 6 Mtpy reached
by 2021. R30 billion will be spent (‘En+ and Shenhua’, 2014,
p. 32; news.chita.ru/61479/; enplus.ru/press/enplus/1215/).
Kolmar is owned by the well-connected Gennadii
Timchenko, although there have been reports that he is
seeking to sell the company, with claimed Chinese inter-
est (vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/04/27/timchenko-
gotov-prodat-dolyu-v-kolmare-kitaitsam). The company has
two underground projects in Yakutia. There are plans to
expand the existing ‘Denisovskii’ mine, just north of
Neryungri, to 2.4Mtpy at a cost of $450million. ‘Inaglinskii’,
further to the north, is a bigger greenﬁeld operation. At a
cost of $830million 6Mtpywill bemined and enriched from
2016, with a second stage to take output to 10.5 Mtpy. The
project includes a railway to Chulbas, on the mainline
running south from Yakutsk to BAM (kolmar.ru/projects/).
In March 2015 the project was included in MFED’s invest-
ment programme (government.ru/media/ﬁles/L2KIqk
MwAvU.pdf).
6.3. Coal forecasts
What do these projects add up to? The ‘Long-term
program for the development of the coal industry of Russia
to 2030’ forecasts output of 500 Mt by 2030, with East
Siberia and the RFE going from 34.6 per cent in 2013 to 56.8
per cent, with the RFE making up 24.4 per cent. The RFE is
also predicted to be the major source of exports to the APR
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(46.0 per cent), with the Kuzbass in second position (27.0
per cent) (see Tables 3–5). It is not clear where that level
of RFE output will come from – none of the major green-
ﬁeld projects listed above are located there and expansion
plans on Sakhalin are modest.
China is the great market hope. Russia delivered 19 Mt,
just over 6 per cent of China’s annual imports, in 2012;
27 Mt in 2013; and 15 Mt in the ﬁrst half of 2014
(minenergo.gov.ru/press/min_news/20303.html). But there
are clear diﬃculties. China’s long-term demand is uncer-
tain on a number of grounds: its growth rate, its desire to
reduce coal consumption for environmental reasons, and
its desire to protect its local coal industry. Minister of Energy
Novak has noted with regret China’s introduction of import
duties in January 2015, which he claimed made some proj-
ects unproﬁtable (minenergo.gov.ru/press/min_news/
20303.html). The new duty led to a drop in Russian exports
to China in the ﬁrst twomonths of 2014 of 40 per cent year-
on-year (vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/03/27/otgruzki
-v-kitai-energeticheskogo-uglya-sokratilis-na-40).
Projected Russian volumes are signiﬁcant but not spec-
tacular by international levels. Export projections for 2025
are 26–34 per cent of Australian export scenarios (Australian
Bulk Commodity Exports, 2012, p. 68). What of costs? Russian
sources show recovery, processing, and non-production costs,
with transport not included, above current global prices
(Dolgosrochnaia programma, 2014, p. 5; ‘Itogi’, 2014a, p. 58).
Global cash cost curves not reproduced here but available
atWhitehaven Coal (2012, pp. 7, 9) show that for coking coal
in 2012 Russian producers were scattered through the third
cost quartile, roughly $80–100/tonne. Most Australian pro-
ducers were in the $60–80 range. For thermal coal Russian
producers were a solid block at the very high end. Austra-
lian producers were scattered along the scale.
7. The transport debate
The Russian cost ﬁgures just mentioned do not include
transport, which is said to make up nearly 50 per cent of
total costs (Kontorovich, Filimonova, Eder, & Provornaia,
2013, p. 55; vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/821481/
valyutnye-relsy-rzhd). The cost curves just cited are FOB,
so include transport costs only up to and including the
loading of the ship in the home port. They therefore distort
the costs of many Russian producers, with long internal
hauls, compared to Australia, whose major transport dis-
tances are by sea.
The deputy governor of Kemerovo region (where Kuzbass
is situated) claims that Russian rail is 2–5 times more
expensive than competitors’ means of transport
(Gammershmidt, 2014). Other sources suggest that the cost
advantage to shipping could be as high as 6:1 (Liao, 1997,
p. 54) or even 8–10:1(novayagazeta.ru/economy/
65738.html). The distance to Shanghai from Newcastle, the
most distant Australian coal loading port, is 9500 km. The
distance from Mezhdurechensk in Kuzbass to Vanino is
5500 km by rail (with the Primore ports another 600 km or
so); from Neryungri to Vanino is 2100 km. The shorter
Russian distances are cancelled out by the higher costs of
rail, without even considering the 3000 sea kilometres from
Vanino to Shanghai. (The sea route from Vladivostok to
Shanghai is 2000 km.)
Even if Russian rail was competitive with the shipping
costs of competitors, there are major questions of rail ca-
pacity and the ﬁnancing of programmes to expand it. The
matter has been one of the most debated RFE policy issues.
Transport issues arise at three levels: access from the deposit
to the nearest main line, port capacity, and main line
capacity.
7.1. Spur lines
Spur line costs are negotiated between licence holder and
Russian Railways, meaning that there has been much toing
and froing in each individual case. There have been various
promises from the state to part-fund, including with money
from FNW, Elegest’s 401-km line to Kuragino (from Kuragino
a main line runs south west to Taishet) (vedomosti.ru/
business/articles/2015/03/30/pochemu-ziyadu-manasiru-
pridetsya-rasstatsya-so-stroigazkonsaltingom).With no sign
of the promises being kept, the project appeared among the
agreements signed during Chinese President Xi’s visit to
Table 3
Forecasts of Russian coal output and exports, Mt.
2013 2015 2020 2025 2030
Total 352 360 400 450 500
Coking 80 106 129 158 200
Thermal 272 254 271 292 300
Exports 140 150 160 180 205
Coking 19 28 38 45 60
Thermal 121 122 122 135 145
To APR 56 60 72 95 120
Coking 11 18 28 35 45
Thermal 45 42 44 60 75
Source: Dolgosrochnaia programma, 2014, p. 9.
Table 4
Forecasts of Russian coal output by region, Mt.
2013
(actual)
2015 2020 2030
Kuzbass 203.6 192 194 178
East Siberia (without Baikal) 51.5 59 68 84
Baikal region 37.1 40 55 78
RFE 33.1 53 82 122
Others 20.8 21 28 31
Source: Dolgosrochnaia programma, 2014, p. 16.
Table 5
Russian coal exports to the APR, by region, 2013 actual and 2030 fore-
cast, Mt.
2013 2030
RFE 10.9 46.0
Baikal region 9.5 20.0
West Siberia 35.0 27.0
Khakasia 3.2 8.0
Others 1.5 19.0
Source: Dolgosrochnaia programma, 2014, p. 17.
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Moscow inMay 2015 (vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/
05/12/rossiiskie-kompanii-rasschitivayut-poluchit-dostup-
k-kitaiskomu-ﬁnansirovaniyu).Whether Chinesemoneywill
be forthcoming, andwhat will happen if it does not, remains
to be seen.
Most of the $2 billionMechel had spent on the Elga mine
up to mid-2013 had gone on the 316-km line to Ulak on
BAM. But as the company struggled with massive debts, the
idea was ﬂoated that Russian Railways buy equity in the line,
perhaps with money lent by Mechel’s creditors, Russia’s
state-owned banks (vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/734171/
igor-zyuzin-vyjdet-iz-tupikovogo-aktiva). Russian Railways
is not keen, and there is no sign of the issue being re-
solved as Mechel’s broader struggle for survival continues.
With regard to the other greenﬁeldmines, it appears that
coal is transported the 60-oddmountainous kilometres from
Apsat to Novaia Chara and the 100 km from the
Zashulanskoe deposit to TransSib by road. The Apsat owners
seem to be responsible for their arrangements; the
Zashulanskoe operators have a Chinese loan for at least part
of their costs.
7.2. Ports
Port development has been almost exclusively the re-
sponsibility of private operators. The most important are
outlined here.
SUEK has 12 Mtpy capacity at Vanino, east of Kha-
barovsk, with plans to double that, and Kolmar is building
a terminal in the area with a planned capacity of 12 Mtpy
when its ﬁrst stage is completed in 2016, to be doubled by
2018 (rg.ru/2013/01/23/vanino.html; vedomosti.ru/
newspaper/article/714421/ugol-vmesto-nefti). Kolmar’s
facility is included in the list of projects to receive funding
from MFED’s investment programme (government.ru/
media/ﬁles/L2KIqkMwAvU.pdf).
Along the Primore coast Mechel owns Poset, an ice-
free coal-loading facility south of Vladivostok and served
by TransSib. It currently handles 4.5Mtpy, with plans to take
it to 7–9Mtpy (mechel.ru/sector/logistics/poset/). Nakhodka’s
Vostochnyi, owned by the Kuzbass coal producer
Kuzbassrazrezugol’ (vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/772451/
ugolschiki-dobavili-vostochnogo), is the largest cargo port
in the RFE, and has a 15 Mtpy coal terminal able to load
150,000 tonne ships at 3000 tonnes/hour. It is expanding
its capacity by another 10 Mtpy by 2017 (ria.ru/interview/
20140219/995778961.html). At the end of 2013 the Kuzbass
producer SDS signed an agreement to build a terminal at
Sukhodol, with a capacity of 6 Mtpy by 2017 and 20 Mtpy
by 2021, although there is now talk of that project being
abandoned (interfax.ru/business/427772).
The current oﬃcial Russian forecast (Dolgosrochnaia
programma, 2014, p. 14) sees coal volumes sent to Russian
ports for delivery to the APR reaching 110 Mtpy by 2030
(from 49.2 in 2013). Projected RFE capacities by individu-
al port in the same report add up to 90 Mtpy, with Poset
and Sakhalin ports not included. If we add themwe get close
to the 110 Mtpy required. That roughly corresponds to the
120Mtpy of exports to the APR by 2030 projected in Table 3,
remembering that some coal will presumably still be shipped
to China by rail.
7.3. Main line capacity
Since late 2011 main line capacity has been a matter of
considerable urgency, the main issue being the capacity of
BAM and TransSib, the two main lines east through Siberia.
For Kuzbass coal miners the upgrading of the line from
Mezhdurechensk, in the Kuzbass, to TransSib and BAM at
Taishet is also a priority. In mid-2015 the government gave
Russian Railways R11.05 billion for that project
(government.ru/docs/18313/).
BAM leaves TransSib at Taishet, to the north west of Lake
Baikal and continues around the north of the lake. It re-
unites with TransSib near Khabarovsk, before branching off
to Vanino to the east. TransSib runs around the south of Lake
Baikal, passing through the Zaibakal, Chita and Amur regions,
and after rejoining BAM near Khabarovsk continues south
through Primore region before ending at Vladivostok and
Nakhodka.
Although it is acknowledged that coal is the most im-
portant product, the other mineral projects described above
also depend on access. Of current throughput coal repre-
sents 48 per cent, minerals 5 per cent, and oil 19 per cent
(Misharin, 2014). As pipelines open, the oil percentage will
decline. Whether the network, particularly BAM, is cur-
rently overloaded or underutilised is a matter of debate
(dvforum.ru/2009/doklads/Zaichenko.pdf; vedomosti.ru/
newspaper/article/713361/i-snova-bam).
Forecasts for future traﬃc through various points are
shown in Table 6. The ﬁrst point, Taishet, includes Kuzbass
coal. The second, just to the west of Tynda, shows changes
to throughput as the lines pass through East Siberia. The
data suggest that more goods are unloaded than are added.
Just beyond this point, loads from the north, through
Neryungri, are added. There is a link line at this point
between BAM and TransSib. The next measurement is of
loads going to Vanino and the nearby general cargo port at
Sovetskaia Gavan. The ﬁnal measurement is on the TransSib
in Primore region, of loads bound for Primore ports. If we
assume that the current 53 per cent of traﬃc taken by coal
and other minerals is maintained to 2020, the share of rail
capacity to Vanino and the Primore ports corresponds pre-
cisely to the forecast 72 Mt of coal exports to the APR that
year.
To reach the forecast capacities, considerable invest-
ment is required. The state-owned monopoly rail
corporation, Russian Railways, insists it does not have the
money, and it is recognised that to raise rates to the level
required for it to self-fund would make Russian coal exports
hopelessly uncompetitive (vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/
482291/vladimir-yakunin-poprosil-na-transsib). After much
Table 6
Actual and forecast loads travelling in an easterly direction at four points
along BAM and TransSib, Mtpy.
2012 2013 2020f
Taishet 80.3 86.0 98.6
West of Tynda 80.2 85.9 98.4
BAM east of Komsomolsk 18.3 22.2 32.6
Primore TransSib 82.0 72.7 105.0
Source: Misharin, 2014, p. 4.
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debate the state has allocated just over half the R562.4 billion
required, the money coming directly from the budget, FNW
and bond purchases by VEB bank (Fortescue, 2015). This is
to increase capacity by 66 Mtpy, divided roughly equally
between BAM and TransSib. An extra provision of R42.3
billion (R29.1 billion from Russian Railways, R7.5 billion from
FNW) for the section of BAM from Tynda to Vanino was an-
nounced in January 2015 (government.ru/docs/16441/).
A major part of the BAM-TransSib debate has been over
whether the extra capacity will be utilised. After the ex-
pansion ﬁgure was set at 66 Mtpy, the responsible deputy
primeminister, Anatolii Dvorkovich, noted that the key ques-
tion remained: ‘Will the required volumes of freight
eventuate?’ He answered by claiming that shippers had
asked for an extra 137Mtpy, meaning that there was plenty
of room for error. He did not point out that if their bids had
any basis in reality a lot of potential output will not have
access to APR markets (government.ru/news/15411/).
Even if the capacity is used, will capital costs be re-
couped? It is claimed that a decade of public and private
infrastructure investment worth $30 billion had in 2011
alone facilitated the export from Australia of 400 million
tonnes of iron ore, 300million tonnes of coal, and 20million
tonnes of LNG (Australian Bulk Commodity Exports, 2012, p.
2). The BAM–TransSib project, to add 66 Mtpy of capacity,
is slated to cost R600 billion just for the rail work. Even if
the recent devaluation in the ruble has reduced that from
about $17 to 11 billion, it is an expensive increase in ca-
pacity, including in comparison to Russian Railways’
expansion plans in other parts of Russia (government.ru/
docs/16441/). One is not surprised that there are those who
believe that the capital expenditure will not be recouped
(vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/396211/slovo_za_sibiryu).
This is as prices for commodity exports into Asia are
falling and predicted to remain ﬂat at best, just as Russian
projects come on line. Australian sources, in acknowledg-
ing poor price prospects, advocate maintaining revenues by
ramping up supply (Australian Bulk Commodity Exports, 2012,
p. 10). Whether that is a good or viable strategy for Aus-
tralia could be debated. It is one which is not available to
Russia, given output and infrastructure limitations. If prices
are not favourable, Russian producers will be left with large
debts and the Russian state with underutilised infrastruc-
ture, with very few options to redress the situation.
8. Conclusion
Russia has offered two strategies for commercial en-
gagement with the APR, in pursuing two goals. The TOR
strategy, originally presented as attracting APR investors to
produce non-resource products for sale in the APR, was de-
signed to bring prosperity to the RFE. So far the reality is
very different. There is little sign of the APR in the shape
of either investors or markets. The TORs so far identiﬁed are
modest, involving largely unknown Russian small and
medium enterprises in ‘industry park’ activities and at-
tracting modest state investment. They are scattered around
the region in a way that suggests regional policy consider-
ations as much as strictly commercial calculations. There
is nothing wrong with that: the weakness of Russia’s SME
sector is often noted and such activities can bring beneﬁts
to local communities. But even assuming that the TORs are
successful at that level, that is not enough to transform the
RFE as a whole into a qualitatively more attractive place to
live and work, and certainly not to realise the most ambi-
tious visions of a Russian Asian Tiger.
The resource strategy is essentially not an RFE strategy,
since the region narrowly deﬁned is not particularly re-
source rich and the strategy is not primarily designed to
contribute to its prosperity but rather to that of the nation
as a whole, as part of a major geostrategic and geo-
commercial shift from West to East.
It could be argued that for Russia any non-negative return
from coal and other mineral exports to the APR is a beneﬁt,
since it is an essentially new commercial activity. But the
scale of even the most optimistic scenarios – of output and
delivery capacity – is modest compared to the major players
in the region, and not obviously low-cost. At best returns
will be marginal, with a real risk of a negative return on
capital for both the state and investors.
Capital commitments in the hydrocarbon sector are sig-
niﬁcantly higher, and eastern-oriented projects are needed
to replace revenues fromWest Siberian output delivered to
the west. If that cannot be achieved, a country with an in-
creasingly expensive view of its place in the world will face
serious problems.
For some time there has been conﬁdence within Russia
– albeit not shared by all – that the country’s natural re-
sources will provide it with prosperity for a long time to
come. There is nothing about the TOR strategy to suggest
that the reliance on resource exports is about to change. The
belief that those resources will be found and sold in the east,
although hardly new, has gained sudden urgency in recent
times. There are suﬃcient questionmarks, regarding not just
demand but also supply and return on investment, to in-
dicate just what a gamble the ‘turn to the East’ is.
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